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1. Introduction 
One of the most remarkable effects of the great financial crisis 2007-08 has been the dramatic 
increase of fiscal deficits and public debts in all developed countries. To prevent recession from 
turning into depression, governments have been forced to adopt fiscal stimulus and bail-out 
packages in order to support domestic demand and to prevent the propagation of a full-blown global 
banking crisis. In addition, budget balances have been further deteriorated by the operation of the 
automatic stabilizers producing reduction in tax revenue and increasing in social expenses. Thus, 
the public debt of many countries has increased in the past few years by 20, 30 or 40 GDP points. 
No doubt that when the crisis will finally over, it will be necessary to deal with such an amount of 
extra-debt. 
While the traditional reaction and the financial orthodoxy suggests that tight fiscal policies – i.e. 
increases of taxations and/or reduction of expenses – are indispensable (indeed the only way) to 
reduce the existing stocks of public debt, we must recognize that the process of liquidation of big 
sovereign debt has followed over history quite different paths (see Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011 and 
IMF, 2012 ch.3). Even though the most favorable solution is, of course, a long period of sustained 
growth, quite often the tools of reducing the public debt have been different: debt repudiation, or 
governments default; debt monetization (i.e. the exceptional increase of inflation to either reduce or 
cancel-out a given stock of debt); Financial repression (i.e., the introduction of portfolio constraints 
for banks and financial institutions, interest rate control, limitations in capital mobility, etc.); Debt 
restructuring. 
In 2010, one of the authors– Visco (2010a, b) – posed the problem of how to relax the fiscal budget 
constraint of the countries affected by the financial crisis so as to prevent them from falling into a 
long-lasting stagnation path. To solve this problem, the creation of a special (global) fund in which 
all the extra debt produced by the financial crisis could be transferred and redeemed over a long 
period of time was proposed. At that time, then, the proposal was simply that of a (partial) 
restructuring of the existing stock of debt with joint (global) liability. 
Later on, a revised and more realistic version of this proposal limited to the reduction of the debt of 
the EZ countries was presented– see Visco (2011a, b). In its new version, the proposal specified the 
creation of a common fund into which EZ countries could transfer their debt exceeding the 60% of 
GDP – which is the critical threshold fixed by the Maastricht Treaty. In order to ensure the whole 
redemption of the stock of debt transferred to the fund, the proposal also foresaw that all involved 
countries would earmark a share of their taxation proceedings – proportional to the size of the debt 
transferred - to be transferred to the Fund in annual installments. 
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The main objective of this proposal was (and still is) to solve the sovereign debt crisis helping, at 
the same time, the recovery of the EZ countries.
1
 
Recently, the German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) presented a very similar proposal – 
see GCEE (2011) and Doluca et al. (2012 a, b) – in which a redemption fund for the European debt 
was proposed. Though some motivations of these papers are different than those of Visco (2010a, b; 
2011a, b), both approaches rely on the same instruments and lead towards similar conclusions.  
In this paper we propose a restatement and a refinement of the original Visco’s proposal. In doing 
so, we take the ERF proposal by Doluca et al. (2012a)
2
 as a benchmark and show that some 
working hypothesis of their paper can be harmlessly skip aside without damaging the objective of 
permanently reducing the stock of public debt.  
Also, the paper provides a numerical application to the case of the Italian sovereign debt and 
provides a straightforward comparison between our results and those found by Doluca et al. (2012a) 
in their simulation analysis. 
In evaluation the contribution of our paper, it is noteworthy that our objectives crucially differ from 
that of Doluca et.al.. While Doluca et al. (2012a) main objective is to provide a redemption 
mechanism able to shrink the debt-to-GDP ratio as fast as possible, our objective is to create an 
alternative redemption mechanism in which the converging path of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
compatible with a non-stressing, medium term fiscal policy scenario. 
We find that the debt amortization scheme proposed in this paper is cheaper than the redemption 
mechanism proposed by Doluca et al. (2012a). Also, we find that fiscal “brakes” are not necessary 
to accomplish the mission of permanently reducing the stock of public debt below the 60%-
threshold of GDP. In particular, for the Italian economy we find that the average saving in interest 
expense adds up to about 34 billion Euros per year – about 2.2% in terms of 2012 GDP – and that 
the average primary surplus required to redeem the debt within the duration of the Fund is no higher 
than 2.5 instead of 4.5 GDP points. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the GCEE proposal 
and provides an updated simulation exercise of their redemption plan for Italy. Section 3 introduces 
a refinement of the basic idea of Visco’s proposal and describes the main functioning mechanism of 
its alternative redemption scheme. It also provides a numerical exercise based on the Italian 
                                                 
1 It is noteworthy that Visco’s proposal is quite different, indeed it is just the opposite - from the proposals presented by 
other economists - see, among others, De Greuwer and Moeslen (2009) and Delpla and Von Weizsaker (2010) – in 
which eurobonds are issued to cover a stock of debt up to the 60% of GDP – the so-called “blue-bond” enjoy the joint 
liability of all the involved countries. Actually, Visco’s bonds - as GCEE’s bonds - would not be eurobonds since each 
single state would keep the responsibility of redeeming its own share. 
2 Doluca et al. (2012b) updates the numerical analysis of the redemption scheme introduced in their previous paper and 
analyze the macroeconomic impact of the proposal is illustrated using the multi-country model NiGEM. Since the basic 
ideas of the ERF do not change with respect to Doluca et al. (2012b), our simulation analysis only relies on the GCEE 
working paper for data construction and comparisons. 
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economy in which some crucial details of the proposal are carefully spelled out. Based on our 
simulation results, Section 4 compares the results of the two proposals, while Section 5 provides a 
possible measure for the economic impact of Visco’s proposal with respect to a baseline scenario in 
which no redemption plan is adopted. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. The GCEE proposal 
The European Redemption Pact (ERP) is a redemption plan proposed by the GCEE in November 
2011 – see GCEE (2011) - and then refined by Doluca et al. (2012a) in February 2012 with the 
introduction of the European Redemption Fund (ERF).
 
According to this proposal, all EZ member 
countries are allowed to split their public debt into two parts: a part that is compatible with the debt 
threshold of 60 % of GDP - hereinafter national debt- and a part exceeding the 60 % ceiling. 
According to the proposal, the part of the debt exceeding the threshold of 60 % of GDP - hereinafter 
extra-debt- can be transferred to an ad-hoc fund – the ERF – for which all the EZ members are 
jointly and severally liable.  
The main objective of the ERP is to incentivize and encourage debt-redemption rather than debt 
accumulation and it is thought of an alternative debt instrument that could help EZ countries to 
refinance themselves at an affordable cost. 
To join the ERF, excessively indebted countries are required to fulfill participation criteria. These 
criteria change from country to country, depending on whether countries are currently running a 
structural adjustment program or not. In particular: 
a. If a country is currently running a structural adjustment program, it can join the redemption 
pact immediately, but its debt can be transferred to the ERF only after the successful 
conclusion of the respective adjustment program (in this moment, the countries that are 
running a structural adjustment program are: Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Ireland); 
b. If a country is not running a structural adjustment program, it can opt to take part to the 
redemption pact immediately provided that its debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the 60 %-ceiling 
(in this moment in time, the countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio higher than 60% not running 
a structural adjustment program are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands, and Spain).
3
 
As emphasized by Doluca et al. (2012a) – see also footnote 3 -, the ERF is not a Eurobonds 
proposal. The main differences from this proposal and the idea of Eurobonds lie in: 
- The limited duration for the ERF: no longer than 25 years; 
                                                 
3
 Notice that at the end of 2011 only 5 countries out of 17 - Finland, Estonia, Luxemburg, Slovenia and Slovakia - do 
not have a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding the 60% of their GDP. 
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- A series of strings and constrains attached to the ERF participation as: (i) The adoption 
of fiscal “brakes”, particularly those required by the Fiscal Compact (FC); (ii) The transfer 
of the revenue of a designated tax for fulfilling the redemption of the extra-debt (for 
example the VAT) through annual payment/obligations; 
4
 (iii) The deposit of collaterals – 
e.g. gold and other forms of collateral - up to 20 % of the transferred debt and an obligation 
to commit to consolidation and structural reforms. 
Annual payment/obligations are the key element of the whole proposal because they determine the 
true financial cost for each country. They are designed to depend on both the volume of the debt to 
be transferred to the Fund and the interest rate on the ERF bonds and are pegged to GDP through 
the so-called annual payment key. The annual payment key is a pro-rated interest payment to the 
redemption fund on the transferred debt. The rate applied to the annual payment key is given by the 
interest rate – fixed to 4% in GCEE proposal –, plus a redemption surcharge equal to 1% of the 
transferred debt. If a country decides to transfer the excessive debt into the ERF, it automatically 
endorses the commitment to: 
1. Maintain the national debt below the level of 60 % of GDP - to this end, debt brakes would 
be introduced in all participating countries;  
2. Maintain the budget deficit below the level of 0.5 % of GDP; 
3. Adopt fiscal brakes at a constitutional level; 
4. Redeem the extra-debt within 25 years; 
It is noteworthy that to redeem the extra-debt in 25 years the countries transferring more debt have 
to bear higher annual payment-obligations, whose amount is related to the volume of the debt 
transferred and is expressed as a constant fraction of GDP. Note also that the endorsement of such 
commitments implicitly implies the respect of the deficit and debt rules of the FC. Indeed, the 
commitment to maintain the national debt below the 60%-ceiling of GDP corresponds to 
maintaining budget deficit below the level of 0.5 % of GDP. Likewise, the commitment to redeem 
the extra-debt within 20 to 25 years corresponds to an annual debt reduction of 1/20th of debt 
exceeding the target level of 60% of GDP. If a member country fails to honor this commitment, the 
transfer of the extra-debt to the Fund is immediately stopped and the collateral lost. 
                                                 
4
 For the sake of truth, the presence of the earmark in the GCEE ERF proposal is a bit ambiguous. While it is present 
and widely discussed in the Council annual report of November 2011 – see GCEE (2011) –, it is not clearly mentioned 
in Doluca et. al (2012a). However, in Doluca et. al (2012a) the participation to the ERF foresees the payment of a 1% 
participation fee taking the form of a redemption surcharge similar to the solidarity surcharge introduced in Germany 
to finance the reunification of the Country. 
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An application to Italy 
In this section we apply the GCEE proposal to Italy. In our simulation, the transfers to the ERF 
starts being effective at the beginning of 2013 (instead that in 2012) and completes after four years 
of roll-in. For the baseline scenario, we adopt the following basic data:
5
 
1. Nominal GDP 2012: 1,564.4 billion Euros (source: Italian Government forecasts); 
2. Expected nominal growth: 3.0% (source: Doluca et al., 2012a); 
3. Public Debt 2012: 1,977.4 billion Euros (source: Italian Government forecasts); 
4. Interest rate on national debt: 5.0% (source: Doluca et al., 2012a); 
5. Debt-to-GDP ratio: 126.4% (source: Italian Government forecasts); 
6. Interest burden in 2012 as % of GDP: 5.5% (source: Italian Government forecasts); 
7. Interest rate on ERF: 4.0% (source: Doluca et al., 2012a). 
According to the proposal, Italy is allowed to transfer to the Fund up to 1,038.8 billion Euros of its 
national debt (i.e. 66.4% of its national debt). Straightforward computations lead to an annual key 
payment of 3.3% of GDP.
6
 Given the large financial demand of Italy, the roll-in phase is spread 
over four years, such that 422 billion Euros are transferred in 2013, 234.8 billion in 2014, 211 
billion in 2015 and, finally, 171 billion in 2016.
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Expected economic growth is set to 3 percentage points per annum. Since the lifespan of the 
simulation exercises covers 25 years, the rate of growth reported in the table can be thought of as 
the average economic growth, where 2 percentage points are due to increases in GDP deflator and 1 
percentage point is due to real growth. 
The interest rate on national debt is set to 5%, while that on the ERF is 4%. This rate is the same 
used by Doluca et al. (2012a) for the case of Italy. Here it is worth noticing that the expected long-
term interest rate reported by DEF (2012) – which is around 5.4% – is not far from the interest rate 
adopted by the GCEE. In comparison with the ten-year bund, the interest rate used by the Italian 
Government accounts for an interest rate spread of about 440 basis points, while the spread 
resulting from Doluca et al. (2012a) analysis is slightly lower and amounts to about 360 basis 
points. Before the financial crisis the BTP-bund spread was steadily lower than 100 basis points. 
To implement the ERF, the Italian Government must commit to adopt the FC rules. Consequently, 
in our simulations the following working assumptions are adopted: 
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The level of nominal GDP, the stock of public debt and interest burden on the Italian public budget are taken from the 
last Documento di Economia e Finanza (DEF, 2012a) and Nota di Aggiornamento del Documento di Economia e 
Finanza (DEF, 2012b) -, which forecasts a level of nominal GDP close to 1,564.4 billion Euros and a Debt-to-GDP 
ratio close to 126.4% for 2012. The remaining data – i.e. the expected growth and the interest rates on national debt and 
ERF - are the same data used by Doluca et. al (2012a) in their numerical simulations. 
6
 For the technical details of the GCEE proposal, interested readers are referred to Doluca et. al (2012a). 
7
It is worth noticing that in our simulations initial data – e.g. the debt-to-GDP ratio, the sequence of sovereign debt 
transmissions to the ERF as well as the size of the Italian sovereign debt to be transferred to ERF – are far different 
from those used by Doluca et. al (2012a) in their simulation analysis. This is so because we use 2013 as the starting year 
instead of 2012.  
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1. During the roll-in phase, no excessive borrowing policy is allowed, so that the ratio between 
budget deficit and GDP is always equal to 0.5 GDP percentage points. 
2. After the roll-in phase - and provided that the debt-to-GDP ratio is steadily lower that the 
ceiling of 60% of GDP -, excessive borrowing is allowed provided that such policies do not 
violate the usual Maastricht constraints (i.e. deficit-to-GDP ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio 
lower than, respectively, 3% and 60% of GDP). 
Figure 1 summarizes the simulation results.
8
 Moving clockwise, the first chart depicts the dynamics 
of the primary surplus (histogram) and the budget deficit (the full line). The second chart shows the 
composition of the interest burden bore by Italy. The third chart shows the time evolution of the 
composition of the sovereign debt of the Italian economy as percentage of GDP. Finally, the fourth 
chart displays the dynamics of the ERF account balance of Italy. 
Figure 1: GCEE proposal: Simulations results. Chart (a): The dynamics of the 
primary-surplus-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios; Chart (b): The composition 
of the interest-expense-to-GDP; Chart (c): the composition of the public debt; 
Chart (d): the ERF account balance (end of the year). 
 
 Chart (a) Chart (b) 
 
 Chart (c) Chart (d) 
As is easy to verify – see Chart (c) –, the share of national debt on total debt decreases because of 
the roll-in (red histogram), while the share of the ERF on total debt initially increases because of the 
debt transfers and then decreases because of the annual payment/obligations (blue histogram). 
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 See Appendix A for the numerical details as well as the computations of the four charts of Figure 1. 
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According to the simulation, the extra-debt would be fully redeemed after 23 rather than 25 years – 
i.e. 2035 instead of 2037. In the meanwhile, fiscal brakes cause the stock of national debt to 
converge towards the threshold of 60% and the budget-deficit-to-GDP ratio to stabilize around 1.7 
percentage points – see the full line in Chart (a). 
The result that the complete redemption of the extra-debt occurs in less than 25 years needs a 
comment because it is in sharp contrast with what found by Doluca et al. (2012a). It can be 
explained by the higher annual payment key used by our simulation exercise – 3.3% Vs. 2.9% used 
by Doluca et al. (2012a) -, which is, in turn, due to the higher initial debt-to-GDP ratio adopted by 
our computations – 126.4% Vs. 123.4% used by Doluca et al. (2012a). Moreover, this result 
emphasizes the sensitiveness of the GCEE proposal to changes in the initial conditions, which leads 
to the paradoxically situation in which more indebted countries are forced to shorten their 
redemption path through higher annual payment-obligations. In Section 4 we will mention this 
characteristic of the redemption scheme described by Doluca et al. (1992) as the main drawback of 
their approach. 
As regards the composition of the interest expense, the weight of the interest payment on national 
debt is initially larger in comparison with that of the ERF. However, as time goes by, the size of 
each annual payments-obligations increases because of economic growth and the cost of national 
debt decreases because of the reduction in the ratio between national debt and GDP. Overall, the 
financing cost generated by the GCEE proposal approaches 6.2 GDP points, where 3.1 percentage 
points can be attributable to the interest pay on national debt and 3.1 percentage points are due to 
the interest pay on the ERF bonds. As we will show in Section 5, the medium term scenario 
proposed by the Doluca et al. (2012a) represents an improvement – however small – with respect to 
a baseline scenario in which no debt-reducing intervention is undertaken. 
3. The Visco’s proposal: A restatement 
This section provides a refinement of the European redemption scheme proposed by Visco (2010a, 
b; 2011a, b). Technically speaking, this redemption scheme consists in a dynamic, country-specific 
amortization schedule. The specificity of each amortization plan stems from the fact that each 
borrower country can tailor its own redemption plan so as to take into account both its financial 
need and its past macroeconomic performance. 
With respect to the GCEE proposal, the main points of departures are basically three, listed below 
with their reasons: 
1. The duration of the Fund and the redemption mechanism. In line with the original 
Visco’s proposal, the duration of the Fund is foreseen in 30 years. 
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2. The redemption plan consists of a sequence of annual payments or installments. Each 
installment includes both an annual interest payment linked to the outstanding debt and a 
chunk of the principal balance. The sequence of the principal payments follows a growing 
amortization path, which makes countries pay less principal at the beginning of the 
redemption. The size of the first principal balance can differ from country to country and 
can be negotiated by the borrowing countries according to their financial and 
macroeconomic needs. As time goes by, however, larger portions go towards paying down 
the principal, with the result that the size of each installment tends to increase over time. 
3. The FC is not applied. In our view, the FC is not necessary for the redemption of the extra-
debt because the Fund appears to be an alternative to the FC. During the roll-in phase, in 
fact, the pace of reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the benchmark of one twentieth 
(5%) per year required by the FC. Consequently, forcing governments to set the budget 
deficit lower than 0.5% of GDP during the roll-in phase would create a random variability of 
the primary surplus of the country – see Chart a) of Figure 1. As the next numerical 
simulation will make it clear, the non-adoption of the FC rules does not compromise the 
successful redemption of the extra-debt, while its adoption it considerably increases the 
primary surplus requirements during the first 5 years of life of the Fund. 
4. Ear-marking and collaterals. An appropriate proportion of the tax revenues is earmarked 
to the coverage and the funding of the annual installments. This element was already present 
in the original Visco’s proposal. As regards the possibility of providing real collaterals to 
balance each country-specific financial risk, in our view they are not necessary because of 
the presence of the ear-marked proceeds. Nevertheless, if the adoption of such extra 
collaterals is considered to be essential for the adoption of a redemption scheme, they can be 
harmlessly included into our proposal since their implementation does not represent an issue 
for our amortization scheme. Still, it is worth noting that the addition of real collaterals can 
generate seniority issues with respect to the share of debt not transferred to the ERF, 
particularly for Italy in which ex-post variations of the seniority status of the sovereign debt 
is forbidden by the law. 
5. The surplus liquidity generated by the flow of annual payments is invested in risk-less 
financial assets.
9
 The sequence of installments generates growing liquidity, which, in fact, 
is given by the difference between the annual payments accruing to the Fund in a certain 
year and the interest pay due to the market. Instead of keeping the surplus liquidity not used, 
our proposal suggests to invest it in instruments with high liquidity and low risk.
 
 
                                                 
9
 This is a change with respect the original proposal – see Visco (2010a, b) –; where the Fund was supposed to freely 
operate in the financial markets with the objective of making profits.  
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The amortization calculator 
In this Section we describe how annual payments are figured out. Let us consider a 
representative EZ country whose sovereign debt is initially larger than the 60%-ceiling of 
GDP. For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that the level of both the outstanding sovereign 
debt and GDP of the representative country is equal to 1000 billion Euros. The debt-to-GDP ratio is 
thus equal to 100%, so the share of sovereign debt to be transferred to the ERF is equal to 400 
billion Euros. 
The flow of transfers of the extra-debt to the ERF – i.e. the so-called roll-in phase – differ from 
country to country and depend on the financing needs of the joining country. Specifically, in our 
proposal the roll-in phase consists on a transfer plan in which all sovereign bonds with maturity date 
close to the beginning of ERF are gradually transferred to the Fund. Let us suppose, for example, 
that the maturity schedule of the representative country’s sovereign bonds foresees the following 
financing needs: 150 billion on 2013, 200 billion on 2014 and 170 billion on 2015. A possible roll-
in agreement can then be represented by a sequence of three annual transfers equal, respectively, to 
150, 200, and 200 billion Euros. 
Once that the extra-debt to be transferred to the Fund and the details of the roll-in phase have been 
established, the next step consists of building a country-specific amortization schedule in which the 
portions of the principal balance in each annual payment (installment) follows a linear profile. Thus, 
given a share of sovereign debt transferred to the Fund, the sequence of annual payments is 
assumed to depend crucially on: 
1. The duration of the Fund; 
2. The initial principal payment (which is left to negotiation and can vary from country to 
country); 
3. The interest rate applied to the Fund. 
The sequence of principal balances is given by the following amortization calculator: 
     
2
1
1
1



NN
NjD
N
j
 (1) 
where D denotes the extra-debt transferred to the ERF, N is the duration of the Fund,   is the initial 
principal balance negotiated by the borrowing country and   is the share of the principal balance 
that must be added to each annual payment year after year. 
If we denote the portion of the principal balance of the jth annual payment by  jPj  , the 
sequence of principal reimbursements is summarized by Table 1, where the last row of the table 
displays an application to case of Italy. 
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As said, for Italy the total amount of the extra-debt to be transferred to the ERF adds to 1038.8 
billion Euros. By choosing an initial portion of the principal balance   equal to 5 billion Euros and 
an overall duration of the Fund, N, of 30 years, the previous formula gives: 
 
 
0431.2
1
2



 


NN
ND
. 
Consequently, the sequence of the principal payments is given by the sequence of principal 
repayments displayed in the last row of Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The principal balances – For the case of Italy: N=30 
and 0431.2  
j 1 2 3 4 …. N-1 N Total 
jP  
Representative 
country 
      2   3  ….   2 N    1 N  D 
Italy 
(billion Euros) 
5.0 7.0 9.1 11.1 …. 62.2 64.3 1038.8 
 
An application to Italy 
Having determined the sequence of the principal balances, the next step consists in determining the 
sequence of the annual payments. In doing so, we need to specify one of the most important 
variables of every redemption scheme: the interest rate. 
To project the interest rate on ERF, the GCEE takes the yields of existing bonds guaranteed by 
European countries - particularly bonds issued by the European Investment Bank or the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) - and the liquidity level of the bonds issued by the Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau, as natural benchmark for the ERF bonds. They then conclude that the financing 
costs of the ERF can be expected to range from 3 to 3.5%, and eventually to reach 4% after the 
normalization of the financial markets. Thus, in their simulation exercise the interest rate on the 
ERF was set to 4%, while that on the national debt was supposed to be slightly higher and fixed to 
5%. 
In our proposal, we take the interest rate currently paid by the ESFS on the EU-bonds as a 
benchmark, particularly the last EFSF placement of the 25-year bond maturing on 3 April 2037, 
whose implied reoffer yield for investors was 3.42%.
10
 Moreover, to project the financing cost on 
                                                 
10
 Alternatively, our choice of the level of the interest rate to be applied to the ERF can be seen as an extension to the 
ERF of the bond pricing procedure adopted by ESFS, according to which the interest rate on EU bonds is made up of a 
25-years Mid-swaps plus a risk premium measured in basis points. Since in this moment in time (15th November 2012) 
the level of the 30-years Mid-swap is equal to 2.47%, the resulting risk premium attached to the Italian ERF bonds 
amounts to 95 basis points. 
 12 
the national debt, we envisage a future scenario in which the interest rate spread between national 
bonds and EU bonds are close to those paid before the beginning of the financial crises between the 
ten-year national bonds and the German Bund. For example, before the bankruptcy of the 
Investment Bank Lehman Brothers, the ten-years Bund-BTP spread was around 40-50 basis points. 
As a result, a good guess for the interest rate on the Italian national debt is 3.9%. This assumption is 
perfectly coherent with the logic of the redemption fund, whose main effect should be to highly 
reduce, or even eliminate, the spreads across countries.
11
 
Let ERFr  denote the interest rate on ERF bonds. According to Table 1, the first principal balance is 
equal to 0.52013 P . Consequently, the total amount of the first installment is given by the following 
formula: 
.201320132013 IPA  , 
where ERFrI *0.4222013   is the pro-rated interest payment. 
From 2014 on, annual payments modify to take into account both the new debt transfers accruing to 
the Fund and the proceedings of the investment of the principal payments. As time goes by, indeed, 
the portions of the principal balance accruing to the Fund generates a stock of liquidity which must 
be used, at the end of the Fund, to redeem the debt. In our proposal the cumulated flow of principal 
balances is invested in risk-less assets. In particular, we assume that the interest rate on surplus 
liquidity (denoted by Lr ) is constant and equal to 3%, and that the proceedings of the investment are 
then used to reduce the size of each installment.
12
 In 2014, the surplus liquidity equates the principal 
payment of the previous year, which is equal to 5 billion Euros. 
At the end of the year, thus, the proceeding of investing this surplus liquidity is equal to
L
L rI *0.52014  , so as the second annual payment is obtained according to the following formula: 
LIIPA 2014.201420142014  , 
where 0.72014 P  (see Table 1, last column) and   ERFrPI *8.2340.422 20132014  . 
                                                 
11
 A possible drawback of all redemption schemes, including that of Doluca et. al (2012a), is that for some countries, 
notably Germany and The Netherlands, the cost of funding the national debt would likely increase because of the fund. 
To cope with this disadvantage, Visco (2011b) envisaged an internal mechanism through which highly-indebted 
countries are supposed to refund (via monetary transfers) the core countries any increase in the interest rate due to 
implementation of the Fund.  
12
 The level of the interest rate to be paid on the surplus liquidity basically takes into account two main considerations: 
(a) the paper issued by the ERF is assigned an AAA rating; (b) After the implementation of the ERF, financial markets 
stabilize around values close to those characterizing the global economy before the bursting of the subprime financial 
crisis. 
The first consideration implies that the interest rate paid by risk-less bonds (i.e. AAA/Aaa rated bonds) cannot be too far 
from that paid by ERF bonds. The second consideration, instead, accounts for both prices and risk premia characterizing 
the world economy before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers – notably from January 2002 to October 2007. During 
this time frame, indeed, both the yields on the 10y German Bund and US Treasury Bond were far higher than 3% and 
they both ranged between 3 and 5.5%. Consequently, our choice of setting Lr  to 3% is descriptive of a medium term 
scenario in which interest rates on safe assets approach the bottom of the range. 
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By iterating forwardly up to time t, it is easy to show that the general formula describing the 
composition of the t-th installment is given by: 
LtERFttt rLrDPA **1    
where tD  denotes the balance of the Fund at the beginning of the year and 



1
1
t
j
jt PL  is the amount 
of surplus liquidity accumulated up to time t. 
Table 2: The amortization schedule for the Italian extra-debt 
(billion Euros). Initial transfer: 422 billion Euros. 
t 
ERF 
Balance P I IL A 
  (*) (a) (b) (c) d= (a)+(b)-(c) 
2013 417.0 5.0 14.4 0.0 19.4 
2014 644.7 7.0 22.3 0.2 29.2 
2015 846.6 9.1 29.3 0.4 38.0 
2016 1,006.5 11.1 34.8 0.6 45.3 
2017 993.3 13.2 34.4 1.0 46.6 
2018 978.1 15.2 34.0 1.4 47.8 
2019 960.9 17.3 33.5 1.8 48.9 
2020 941.6 19.3 32.9 2.3 49.8 
2021 920.2 21.3 32.2 2.9 50.6 
2022 896.8 23.4 31.5 3.6 51.3 
2023 871.4 25.4 30.7 4.3 51.8 
2024 843.9 27.5 29.8 5.0 52.3 
2025 814.4 29.5 28.9 5.8 52.5 
2026 782.8 31.6 27.9 6.7 52.7 
2027 749.2 33.6 26.8 7.7 52.7 
2028 713.6 35.6 25.6 8.7 52.6 
2029 675.9 37.7 24.4 9.8 52.3 
2030 636.2 39.7 23.1 10.9 52.0 
2031 594.4 41.8 21.8 12.1 51.5 
2032 550.6 43.8 20.3 13.3 50.8 
2033 504.7 45.9 18.8 14.6 50.0 
2034 456.8 47.9 17.3 16.0 49.1 
2035 406.8 49.9 15.6 17.5 48.1 
2036 354.9 52.0 13.9 19.0 46.9 
2037 300.8 54.0 12.1 20.5 45.7 
2038 244.7 56.1 10.3 22.1 44.2 
2039 186.6 58.1 8.4 23.8 42.7 
2040 126.5 60.2 6.4 25.6 41.0 
2041 64.3 62.2 4.3 27.4 39.2 
2042 0.0 64.3 2.2 29.2 37.2 
Total … 1,038.8 667.7 314.1 1,392.3 
 
Table 2 shows the composition of each annual payment and the principal balance. Notice that at the 
end of the redemption time, the overall gain due to the proceedings of investing the surplus liquidity 
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adds to 314.1 billion Euros, while the interest pay bore by Italy adds to about 667.7 billion Euros. 
This means that the net interest pay is 353.6 billion Euros, which gives an average interest saving of 
8.4 billion Euros per year. 
Fiscal Policy implications 
Once shown how the ERF does work, in this section we turn to the fiscal policy implications of our 
proposal. Basic textbooks in economics usually summarize the dynamics of a country’s debt-to-
GDP ratio through the following difference equation: 
  ttttt dgipd   
where ttt GDPDd /  denotes the debt-to-GDP ratio, ttt ddd  1  is the change in the debt-to-
GDP ratio, tp  is the primary surplus and ti  is the average nominal interest rate paid on the 
outstanding stock of public debt at time t. To calibrate our amortization plan we set 3.9%ti  and 
assume the same growth prospect envisaged by the GCEE: %3g . 
Figure 2 shows the policy implications of our proposal.
13
 Specifically, Chart (a) shows the time 
paths of the primary surplus and the deficit-to-GDP ratio compatible with the goal of redeeming the 
Italian debt in 30 years.
14
 Chart (b) displays the composition of the interests to GDP ratio, while 
Chart (c) shows a similar picture for the public debt. Finally, Chart (d) shows the time evolution of 
the principal balance of the ERF. 
Because of the transfers to ERF, the stock of the national debt initially falls, while the stock of the 
extra-debt increases – see Chart (c). After the completion of the roll-in phase, the national debt 
approaches its reference level of 60% of GDP – see the red histogram of Chart (c) –, while the total 
amount of debt transferred to the ERF reaches the peak in 2016 – see the blue histogram of Chart 
(c) or, alternatively, the whole histogram of Chart (d). 
After the roll-in, each government must setup its fiscal policy strategy so as to guarantee the double 
goal of redeeming year after year its extra-debt and maintaining the level of the national debt 
steadily below the 60%-ceiling of GDP. On this respect, our proposal adopts for the budget deficit 
the 3% rule of the Maastricht Treaty. More specifically, in our simulations, during the roll-in phase 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio cannot exceed the ceiling of 3% of GDP initially. After the roll-in phase, 
though, the paramount rule for the government is the maintenance of the level of the national debt 
steadily below the threshold of 60% of GDP. 
                                                 
13
 Readers interested in the numerical details of the four charts of Figure 2 are referred to Appendix B 
14
 As is customary, in our simulations we assume that all the exogenous variables of the model are time invariant, so 
that no external effects prevent the model to converge to their equilibrium values. 
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Figure 2: Visco’s proposal: Simulations results. Chart (a): The dynamics of the 
primary-surplus-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios; Chart (b): The composition 
of the interest-expense-to-GDP; Chart (c): the composition of the public debt; 
Chart (d): the ERF account balance (end of the year). 
 
 Chart (a) Chart (b) 
 
 Chart (c) Chart (d) 
As shown by Chart (a) of Figure 2, the adoption of this simple fiscal rule does not prevent Italy 
from both redeeming its extra-debt and stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio below the 60% of GDP. 
As shown by Chart (a), indeed, after the roll-in the budget-deficit-to-GDP ratio never exceeds the 
1.7%-threshold of GDP, a value which is even lower than the deficit-to-GDP ratio expected by the 
Italian Government for the end of 2012. 
As regards the behavior of the primary surplus, Chart (a) makes it possible to split the dynamics of 
the primary-surplus-to-GDP ratio into two different phases. Initially – namely from 2013 to 2016 –, 
the primary surplus increases over time until it reaches 3.5 GDP points. This initial increase in the 
ratio is the result of the high interest expense bore by Italy during the roll-in. Then, the primary-
surplus-to-GDP ratio steadily falls over time towards the minimum level 1.6% of GDE. 
The fall in the primary-surplus-to-GDP ratio can be basically attributable to both the stabilization of 
the interest expense in relation to GDP and the economic growth. As regards the former, it is 
noteworthy that along the whole duration of the Fund the proceedings accruing to the Fund because 
of the investment of the surplus liquidity play a crucial role for the redemption of the extra-debt, 
particularly in the last phase. 
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Indeed, as shown by Figure 3, though the size of the proceedings are not very important at the 
beginning of the Fund, their contribution gets larger and larger as time goes by, thereby making the 
size of each installment fall from 2026 on. 
Figure 3: Annual payments vs. proceedings of the investment of the surplus 
liquidity (billions of Euros) 
 
4. Comparing proposals 
Once the details of both proposals have been spelled out, it is now time to compare the two 
proposals. 
From a technical point of view, probably the main differences between our proposal and that of the 
GCEE are three: 
a. The duration; 
b. The calculation of the annual payment; 
c. The use of the surplus liquidity. 
From a logical point of view, the first two arguments are intrinsically linked. In the GCEE proposal 
the duration of the Fund is instead a vague concept. Even though the duration of the ERF is 
supposed to be 25 years, in their paper the redemption mechanism proposed – particularly the key 
annual payment – is not linked to the expected duration of the Fund because it depends on the 
growth prospect of the participating country (which of course an exogenous variable not affected by 
the ERF). It is easy to demonstrate that the time required to redeem the extra-debt falls to 20 years 
in the presence of an average growth rate of 5% instead of 3% and that it jumps to 30 years in the 
presence of a lower growth prospect of 1.5% Accordingly, the dynamics of the annual 
payment/obligations change dramatically because of the growth prospect of the borrowing country 
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as well as the financial cost of the ERF. This feature of the German proposal makes the dynamics of 
the ERF – not only its duration – very uncertain. 
In our proposal, instead, both the duration of the redemption plan and the sequence of annual 
installments are clearly determined at the beginning of the redemption time by the amortization 
schedule. In our view this can help governments to relax both political and economic pressures on 
the public budget and to rely on a less compelling use of the proceedings of taxation; also a longer 
redemption period would help countries to adjust the term structure of the national debt not 
exceeding the 60% of GDP, while lengthening the term structure of that transferred to the ERP (30 
years). Also, the possibility for all adhering countries to negotiate the first principal balance makes 
our proposal more flexible without compromising the complete redemption of the extra-debt within 
the duration of the Fund. 
As regards the last technical points – namely the possibility of investing the surplus liquidity in 
riskless assets –, our proposal makes it possible to “recycle” the mass of liquidity currently 
transferred by all participating countries. By allowing the authority managing the ERF to use the 
financial market circuits to generate revenues through the investment of the surplus liquidity, our 
proposal intends to contribute in reducing the existing shortage of liquidity characterizing many 
financial markets and to help countries in reducing the interest bill embodied by each installment. 
From the financial point of view, the main differences between the two proposals rotate around the 
following two points: 
a. The overall financing cost of the redemption; 
b. The fiscal policy implications. 
Table 3 summarizes the financial cost and policy implications of the two proposals.
15
 As is easy to 
see, our amortization scheme is undoubtedly less expensive than the redemption scheme proposed 
by Doluca et al. (2012a). The overall saving in financial costs of our proposal, in fact, adds to 248.9 
billion Euros, which in turn implies an average saving on the interest expense on the extra-debt of 
14.4 billion Euros per year. Such a saving is due to the proceedings of the investment of the surplus 
liquidity – whose total amount adds up to 314.1 billion Euros (see Table 2) – and to the lower 
interest rate paid on the extra-debt assumed by Visco’s proposal.  
All these differences have noticeable implications for national fiscal policies. As the last two rows 
of Table 3 emphasizes, the adoption of our proposal entails a reduction in the average primary 
surplus required to cancel out the extra-debt of 1 GDP point – 4.5% for the Doluca et al. (2012a) 
proposal vs. 2.5% for Visco’s proposal. Similarly, the average saving on the interest expense on the 
overall outstanding debt is close ot 2 GDP points.  
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 The numerical details and computations of the 25-years Visco’s proposal are collected by Appendix C 
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Table 3: Comparing proposals. (*) The overall financial cost of Visco’s 
proposal is equal to the overall interest pay less the revenue of the 
investment of the surplus liquidity; (**) The average financial cost is 
equal to the ratio between the overall financial cost of each proposal and 
its duration. 
  
GCEE’s 
proposal 
Visco’s 
proposal 
(redemption 
in 30 years) 
Visco’s 
proposal 
(redemption 
in 25 years) 
        
Overall financing cost of the Fund (billion Euros) 602.5 353.6 302.1 
-          Effective duration of the Fund (years) 23 30 25 
-          Average financing cost (**) 26.2 11.8 12.1 
        
Average primary surplus (% of GDP) 4.5 2.5 2.9 
        
Overall interest expense  (% of GDP) 6.2 4.2 4.7 
-          on national debt 3.1 2.3 2.3 
-          on ERF 3.1 1.9 2.3 
 
This result can be explained in terms of the financial cost saving discussed earlier and the absence 
of any form of fiscal “brakes” envisaged by our proposal. In our view, this result is particular 
noteworthy because it confirms our initial statement that the adoption of the FC is not necessary for 
the successful redemption of the extra-debt. 
Since the two proposals differ in the duration of the Fund, one could assert that the better 
performance of our Fund can be attributable to the longer redemption time envisaged by Visco’s 
proposal. Thus, in order to check whether the results reported by Table 3 are sensitive to changes in 
the duration of the Fund, we ran an additional numerical simulation where the duration of our 
amortization scheme is restricted to 25 years. 
Our numerical results show that Visco’s proposal remains the more attractive proposal. With 
respect to our 30-years baseline proposal, reducing the duration of the Fund to 25 years increases 
the financial cost of the redemption from 11.8 to 12.1 billion Euros. Also, the reduction in the 
duration of the Fund is not harmless for the fiscal policy since it requires higher primary surpluses 
because of the increase in the interest expense on ERF. Nevertheless, the rises in the average 
primary surplus and interest expense are still lower than those required by Doluca et al. (2012a), 
meaning that the duration of the Fund is not a crucial element for evaluating both the effectiveness 
and convenience of the two proposals.
16
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 It is possible to show that our redemption scheme performs better than that proposed of the GCEE even in the 
presence of positive interests for both funds as well as in case of a lower growth rate of GDP  - for example 2% of 
nominal growth instead of 3%. The numerical details of this extra exercise are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 4: The Italian economy with and without ERF - Chart (a): interest 
expense on sovereign debt (data in % of GDP); Chart (b): debt-to-GDP ratio; 
Chart (c): Primary surplus-to-GDP ratio; Chart (d): Deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
 
 Chart (a) Chart (b) 
 
 Chart (c) Chart (d) 
5. The Italian economy without ERF 
As a last simulation exercise, in this section we evaluate the gain of adopting the ERF by comparing 
the long-run scenario we showed in Section 3 with a baseline scenario in which no proposal is 
adopted but the FC. To build the baseline scenario we make the following basic assumptions: 
- Average interest expense on the outstanding sovereign debt: 5.8% of GDP; 
- Fiscal tightness: Deficit-to-GDP ratio no higher than 0.5 % of GDP in case the debt-to-GDP 
ratio exceeded the 60%-threshold of GDP. 
Figure 4 summarizes the main results of the comparison. In the figure, Chart (a) compares the 
interests expense on the outstanding debt with (red histogram) and without (blue histogram) the 
ERF. Chart (b) shows the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio, while Chart (c) shows the dynamics 
of the surplus-to-GDP ratios required to make the stock of sovereign debt converge below the 60% 
of GDP in 30 years. Finally, Chart (d) compares the time paths of the deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
A glance at Chart (c) makes it clear how the implementation of the ERF considerately improves the 
financial conditions of the Italian economy. In the presence of the ERF, the primary budget required 
to redeem the ERF is always lower than 3.5% of GDP, while, in the absence of, it is always far 
higher than 3.5% (with the exception of the last 5 years). 
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The fiscal austerity of the baseline scenario is necessary to allow the debt-to-GDP ratio to match the 
Maastricht Treaty requirements of 60% of GDP in thirty years. In our calculations, in fact, the fiscal 
tightness lasts exactly thirty years – see the Chart (d) –, a time length which is very difficult to be 
sustained from the point of view of the social cohesion. By implementing the ERF, instead, the 
overall amount of resources freed in 30 years adds to 1,480 billion Euros, with an average of about 
49 billion Euros per year.
 17
 
6. Final remarks 
In this paper we presented an amortization scheme for the European public debt that restates and 
refines the original idea of the ERF proposed by Visco (2010a,b; 2011a,b). Our objective is that of 
building a debt-redemption device able to help EZ countries to reduce permanently their stock of 
debt exceeding the 60% of GDP, without compromising their economic growth prospects and social 
cohesion. 
In contrast with the redemption scheme recently proposed by Doluca et al. (2012a), our proposal of 
ERF turns out to be cheaper and less constraining. For the case of the Italian economy, in fact, we 
find that an average interests saving close to 14 billion Euros per year and an average primary 
surplus required to redeem the extra-debt that is always lower – on average 1 GDP point per year - 
than what found by Doluca et al. (2012a). 
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 It is worth noting that the redemption scheme proposed by the GCEE also represents an improvement with respect to 
the alternative scenario in which no intervention is adopted. Indeed, as pointed out by Doluca et. al (2012a), both the 
interest expense and primary surpluses are undoubtedly higher in the absence of the ERF. However, the higher financial 
impact that their ERF proposal tends to produce on the public budget makes it possible to think of their proposal as a 
kind of second-best with respect of our proposal. 
 21 
References 
[1]  DEF (2012a): Documento di economia e Finanza, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 
April. Available at http://www.tesoro.it/doc-finanza-pubblica/dfp.def.asp?adr=2012 
[2]  DEF (2012b): Noa di Aggiornamento del Documento di economia e Finanza, Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze, September 20. Available at http://www.tesoro.it/doc-finanza-
pubblica/def/2012/documenti/Nota_DEF_2012-10-02.pdf 
[3]  De Greuwer and Moeslen W. (2009): Gains for all: a proposal for a common Eurobond, 
Intereconomics, May-June. 
[4]  Delpla J. and Von Weizsaker J (2010): The Blue Bond Proposal, Bruguel Policy Brief, May. 
[5]  Doluca H., Hübner D. H, Rumpf D. and Weigert B. (2012a) The European Redemption Pact: 
An illustrative Guide, Working Paper 02/2012. 
[6]  Doluca H, M. Hübner, D. Rumpf and B. Weigert (2012b): "The European Redemption Pact: 
Implementation and macroeconomic effects", Intereconomics: Review of European Economic 
Policy, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 230-239, July. 
[7]  GCEE (2011): German Council of Economic experts Annual Report 2011/12, November. 
[8]  IMF (2012): The World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain., The 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, April. 
[9]  Reinhart C. and Sbrancia M.B. (2011): The liquidation of government debt: NBER, march. 
[10]  Visco V. (2010a): Come salvarsi dalla deflazione; Corriere della Sera, 13 luglio. 
[11]  Visco V. (2010b): How to avoid a global deflation? A proposal for a global found, 
www.nens.it 
[12]  Visco V. (2011a) Innovative financing at a global and European level; hearing at the 
European Parliament, 10 gennaio. 
[13]  Visco V. (2011b): Eurobonds? I conti tornano; il Sole 24 Ore, 12 luglio 2011. 
 22 
Appendix 
A. GCEE proposal: The computational details 
Table A.1: Payment-Obligations computation 
t Roll-in D[t]= i on ERF= n = 
GDP 
2012 APK= Surcharge 
2013 422.0 422.0 0.0400 25 1564.4 0.0332 0.0100 
2014 234.8 651.9 i on N.D.=          
2015 211.0 854.1 0.0500         
2016 171.0 1011.9           
Debt to be 
transferred 1038.8             
t 
ERF 
Balance 
(*) 
Hypothetical 
payment 
allocation 
Correction 
for debt not 
yet 
transferred 
to the ERF 
Payment-
obligations 
at time t I[t] A[t]   
  
 
(a) (b) (c)=(a)-(b) (d) (f)=(c)-(d)   
                
2013 417.1 53.5 31.8 21.7 16.88 4.9   
2014 643.1 55.1 20.3 34.8 26.08 8.8   
2015 840.9 56.8 9.3 47.4 34.17 13.2   
2016 993.9 58.5 0.0 58.5 40.48 18.0   
2017 973.5 60.2 0.0 60.2 39.76 20.5   
2018 950.4 62.0 0.0 62.0 38.94 23.1   
2019 924.5 63.9 0.0 63.9 38.02 25.9   
2020 895.7 65.8 0.0 65.8 36.98 28.8   
2021 863.8 67.8 0.0 67.8 35.83 31.9   
2022 828.5 69.8 0.0 69.8 34.55 35.2   
2023 789.8 71.9 0.0 71.9 33.14 38.8   
2024 747.3 74.1 0.0 74.1 31.59 42.5   
2025 700.9 76.3 0.0 76.3 29.89 46.4   
2026 650.4 78.6 0.0 78.6 28.04 50.5   
2027 595.5 80.9 0.0 80.9 26.02 54.9   
2028 536.0 83.3 0.0 83.3 23.82 59.5   
2029 471.6 85.8 0.0 85.8 21.44 64.4   
2030 402.0 88.4 0.0 88.4 18.86 69.6   
2031 327.0 91.1 0.0 91.1 16.08 75.0   
2032 246.3 93.8 0.0 93.8 13.08 80.7   
2033 159.5 96.6 0.0 96.6 9.85 86.8   
2034 66.4 99.5 0.0 99.5 6.38 93.1   
2035 0.0 102.5 0.0 102.5 2.66 99.8   
                
        (*) End of the year 
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Table A.2: Public finance implications 
t    Billion Euros % of GDP     
Y[t] 
Nominal GDP 1564,4 -     
        - Av. Growth Rate  3,0 -     
D[t] Outstanding Debt 1977,4 126,4     
S[t] Primary Surplus 45,4 2,9     
I[t] Interest expense 86,0 5,5     
BD[t] Budget Deficit 40,7 2,6     
  I[t] Budget Deficit Primary Surplus 
t ERF % of GDP 
National 
Debt % of GDP Total % of GDP BD[t] 
Deficit-
GDP ratio S[t]  
Prim-
surplus-
GDP ratio 
  (a)   (b)   (c)=(a)+(b)   (d)   
(e)=(c )-
(d) 
  
                      
2013 21,7 1,3 78,2 4,9 99,9 6,2 8,1 0,5 91,8 5,7 
2014 34,8 2,1 66,8 4,0 101,7 6,1 8,3 0,5 93,4 5,6 
2015 47,4 2,8 56,7 3,3 104,1 6,1 8,5 0,5 95,6 5,6 
2016 58,5 3,3 50,8 2,9 109,3 6,2 52,8 3,0 56,5 3,2 
2017 60,2 3,3 53,5 3,0 113,7 6,3 54,4 3,0 59,3 3,3 
2018 62,0 3,3 56,0 3,0 118,1 6,3 50,0 2,7 68,0 3,6 
2019 63,9 3,3 57,7 3,0 121,6 6,3 33,6 1,7 88,0 4,6 
2020 65,8 3,3 59,5 3,0 125,2 6,3 34,6 1,7 90,6 4,6 
2021 67,8 3,3 61,2 3,0 129,0 6,3 35,7 1,7 93,3 4,6 
2022 69,8 3,3 63,1 3,0 132,9 6,3 36,7 1,7 96,1 4,6 
2023 71,9 3,3 65,0 3,0 136,9 6,3 37,8 1,7 99,0 4,6 
2024 74,1 3,3 66,9 3,0 141,0 6,3 39,0 1,7 102,0 4,6 
2025 76,3 3,3 68,9 3,0 145,2 6,3 40,1 1,7 105,0 4,6 
2026 78,6 3,3 71,0 3,0 149,5 6,3 41,4 1,7 108,2 4,6 
2027 80,9 3,3 73,1 3,0 154,0 6,3 42,6 1,7 111,4 4,6 
2028 83,3 3,3 75,3 3,0 158,7 6,3 43,9 1,7 114,8 4,6 
2029 85,8 3,3 77,6 3,0 163,4 6,3 45,2 1,7 118,2 4,6 
2030 88,4 3,3 79,9 3,0 168,3 6,3 46,5 1,7 121,8 4,6 
2031 91,1 3,3 82,3 3,0 173,4 6,3 47,9 1,7 125,4 4,6 
2032 93,8 3,3 84,8 3,0 178,6 6,3 49,4 1,7 129,2 4,6 
2033 96,6 3,3 87,3 3,0 183,9 6,3 50,9 1,7 133,1 4,6 
2034 99,5 3,3 89,9 3,0 189,4 6,3 52,4 1,7 137,1 4,6 
2035 69,1 2,2 92,6 3,0 161,7 5,2 54,0 1,7 107,7 3,5 
2036 0,0 0,0 95,4 3,0 95,4 3,0 55,6 1,7 39,8 1,3 
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Table A.3: Public debt dynamics 
  Debt (Billion euros) GDP Debt (as a % of GDP) 
t Extra National Total Level growth Extra National Total 
  (*) (a) (b)       (d) (e)=(d)*iL 
                  
2013 417,1 1563,5 1980,6 1611,3 3,0 25,9 97,0 122,9 
2014 643,1 1337,0 1980,1 1659,7 3,0 38,8 80,6 119,3 
2015 840,9 1134,5 1975,4 1709,5 3,0 49,2 66,4 115,6 
2016 993,9 1016,4 2010,3 1760,7 3,0 56,4 57,7 114,2 
2017 973,5 1070,8 2044,2 1813,6 3,0 53,7 59,0 112,7 
2018 950,4 1120,8 2071,2 1868,0 3,0 50,9 60,0 110,9 
2019 924,5 1154,4 2078,9 1924,0 3,0 48,1 60,0 108,1 
2020 895,7 1189,0 2084,8 1981,7 3,0 45,2 60,0 105,2 
2021 863,8 1224,7 2088,5 2041,2 3,0 42,3 60,0 102,3 
2022 828,5 1261,5 2090,0 2102,4 3,0 39,4 60,0 99,4 
2023 789,8 1299,3 2089,1 2165,5 3,0 36,5 60,0 96,5 
2024 747,3 1338,3 2085,6 2230,5 3,0 33,5 60,0 93,5 
2025 700,9 1378,4 2079,4 2297,4 3,0 30,5 60,0 90,5 
2026 650,4 1419,8 2070,2 2366,3 3,0 27,5 60,0 87,5 
2027 595,5 1462,4 2057,9 2437,3 3,0 24,4 60,0 84,4 
2028 536,0 1506,2 2042,2 2510,4 3,0 21,4 60,0 81,4 
2029 471,6 1551,4 2023,0 2585,7 3,0 18,2 60,0 78,2 
2030 402,0 1598,0 2000,0 2663,3 3,0 15,1 60,0 75,1 
2031 327,0 1645,9 1972,9 2743,2 3,0 11,9 60,0 71,9 
2032 246,3 1695,3 1941,6 2825,5 3,0 8,7 60,0 68,7 
2033 159,5 1746,1 1905,7 2910,2 3,0 5,5 60,0 65,5 
2034 66,4 1798,5 1864,9 2997,6 3,0 2,2 60,0 62,2 
2035 0,0 1852,5 1852,5 3087,5 3,0 0,0 60,0 60,0 
2036 0,0 1908,1 1908,1 3180,1 3,0 0,0 60,0 60,0 
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B. 30-years Visco’s proposal: The computational details 
Table B.1: The amortization schedule – β = 2.0431 
t Roll-in D[t]= i = n = P[0] = iL= n = 
2013 422.0 422.0 0.0342 30 5.0 0.0300 30 
2014 234.8 651.8           
2015 211.0 855.7           
2016 171.0 1017.6           
Total 1038.8             
t 
ERF 
Balance 
(*) P[t] I[t] R[t] 
SL[t]  
(*) IL[t] A[t] 
  
 
(a) (b) (c)=(a)+(b) (d) (e)=(dt-1)*iL (f)=(c)-(e) 
                
2013 417.0 5.0 14.4 19.4 5.0 0.0 19.4 
2014 644.7 7.0 22.3 29.3 12.0 0.2 29.2 
2015 846.6 9.1 29.3 38.4 21.1 0.4 38.0 
2016 1006.5 11.1 34.8 45.9 32.3 0.6 45.3 
2017 993.3 13.2 34.4 47.6 45.4 1.0 46.6 
2018 978.1 15.2 34.0 49.2 60.6 1.4 47.8 
2019 960.9 17.3 33.5 50.7 77.9 1.8 48.9 
2020 941.6 19.3 32.9 52.2 97.2 2.3 49.8 
2021 920.2 21.3 32.2 53.5 118.6 2.9 50.6 
2022 896.8 23.4 31.5 54.9 141.9 3.6 51.3 
2023 871.4 25.4 30.7 56.1 167.4 4.3 51.8 
2024 843.9 27.5 29.8 57.3 194.8 5.0 52.3 
2025 814.4 29.5 28.9 58.4 224.4 5.8 52.5 
2026 782.8 31.6 27.9 59.4 255.9 6.7 52.7 
2027 749.2 33.6 26.8 60.4 289.5 7.7 52.7 
2028 713.6 35.6 25.6 61.3 325.2 8.7 52.6 
2029 675.9 37.7 24.4 62.1 362.9 9.8 52.3 
2030 636.2 39.7 23.1 62.8 402.6 10.9 52.0 
2031 594.4 41.8 21.8 63.5 444.4 12.1 51.5 
2032 550.6 43.8 20.3 64.1 488.2 13.3 50.8 
2033 504.7 45.9 18.8 64.7 534.1 14.6 50.0 
2034 456.8 47.9 17.3 65.2 582.0 16.0 49.1 
2035 406.8 49.9 15.6 65.6 631.9 17.5 48.1 
2036 354.9 52.0 13.9 65.9 683.9 19.0 46.9 
2037 300.8 54.0 12.1 66.2 737.9 20.5 45.7 
2038 244.7 56.1 10.3 66.4 794.0 22.1 44.2 
2039 186.6 58.1 8.4 66.5 852.1 23.8 42.7 
2040 126.5 60.2 6.4 66.5 912.3 25.6 41.0 
2041 64.3 62.2 4.3 66.5 974.5 27.4 39.2 
2042 0.0 64.3 2.2 66.4 1038.8 29.2 37.2 
Total - 1038.8 667.7 1706.4 - 314.1 1392.3 
(*) End of the year 
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Table B.2: Public finance implications 
t    Billion Euros % of GDP     
Y[t] 
Nominal GDP 1564.4 -     
        - Av. Growth Rate  3.0 -     
D[t] Outstanding Debt 1977.4 126.4     
S[t] Primary Surplus 45.4 2.9     
I[t] Interest expense 86.0 5.5     
BD[t] Budget Deficit 40.7 2.6     
 
I[t] Budget Deficit Primary Surplus 
t ERF 
% of 
GDP 
National 
Debt % of GDP Total 
% of 
GDP BD[t] 
Deficit-GDP 
ratio S[t]  
Prim.-
Surplus-
GDP 
ratio 
  (a)   (b)   (c)=(a)+(b)   (d)   (e)=(c)-(d) 
                       
2013 19.4 1.2 62.3 3.9 81.7 5.1 41.9 2.6 39.8 2.5 
2014 29.2 1.8 54.2 3.3 83.4 5.0 26.6 1.6 56.8 3.4 
2015 38.0 2.2 46.9 2.7 84.9 5.0 25.6 1.5 59.3 3.5 
2016 45.3 2.6 41.2 2.3 86.5 4.9 24.7 1.4 61.9 3.5 
2017 46.6 2.6 42.4 2.3 89.1 4.9 30.8 1.7 58.3 3.2 
2018 47.8 2.6 43.7 2.3 91.5 4.9 32.6 1.7 58.9 3.2 
2019 48.9 2.5 45.0 2.3 93.9 4.9 33.6 1.7 60.3 3.1 
2020 49.8 2.5 46.4 2.3 96.2 4.9 34.6 1.7 61.6 3.1 
2021 50.6 2.5 47.8 2.3 98.4 4.8 35.7 1.7 62.7 3.1 
2022 51.3 2.4 49.2 2.3 100.5 4.8 36.7 1.7 63.8 3.0 
2023 51.8 2.4 50.7 2.3 102.5 4.7 37.8 1.7 64.7 3.0 
2024 52.3 2.3 52.2 2.3 104.4 4.7 39.0 1.7 65.5 2.9 
2025 52.5 2.3 53.8 2.3 106.3 4.6 40.1 1.7 66.1 2.9 
2026 52.7 2.2 55.4 2.3 108.1 4.6 41.4 1.7 66.7 2.8 
2027 52.7 2.2 57.0 2.3 109.7 4.5 42.6 1.7 67.1 2.8 
2028 52.6 2.1 58.7 2.3 111.3 4.4 43.9 1.7 67.5 2.7 
2029 52.3 2.0 60.5 2.3 112.8 4.4 45.2 1.7 67.7 2.6 
2030 52.0 2.0 62.3 2.3 114.3 4.3 46.5 1.7 67.7 2.5 
2031 51.5 1.9 64.2 2.3 115.6 4.2 47.9 1.7 67.7 2.5 
2032 50.8 1.8 66.1 2.3 116.9 4.1 49.4 1.7 67.6 2.4 
2033 50.0 1.7 68.1 2.3 118.1 4.1 50.9 1.7 67.3 2.3 
2034 49.1 1.6 70.1 2.3 119.3 4.0 52.4 1.7 66.9 2.2 
2035 48.1 1.6 72.2 2.3 120.4 3.9 54.0 1.7 66.4 2.2 
2036 46.9 1.5 74.4 2.3 121.4 3.8 55.6 1.7 65.8 2.1 
2037 45.7 1.4 76.6 2.3 122.3 3.7 57.2 1.7 65.1 2.0 
2038 44.2 1.3 78.9 2.3 123.2 3.7 59.0 1.7 64.2 1.9 
2039 42.7 1.2 81.3 2.3 124.0 3.6 60.7 1.7 63.3 1.8 
2040 41.0 1.1 83.8 2.3 124.7 3.5 62.5 1.7 62.2 1.7 
2041 39.2 1.1 86.3 2.3 125.4 3.4 64.4 1.7 61.0 1.7 
2042 37.2 1.0 88.9 2.3 126.1 3.3 66.4 1.7 59.7 1.6 
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Table B.3: Public debt dynamics 
  Debt (Billion euros) GDP Debt (as a % of GDP) 
t Extra National Total Level growth Extra National Total 
 
(a) (b) (c)=(a)+(b) (d) 
 
(e)=(a)/(d) (f)=(b)/(d) (g)=(e)+(f) 
                  
2013 417.0 1597.3 2014.3 1611.3 3.0 25.9 99.1 125.0 
2014 644.7 1389.1 2033.8 1659.7 3.0 38.8 83.7 122.5 
2015 846.6 1203.7 2050.4 1709.5 3.0 49.5 70.4 119.9 
2016 1006.5 1057.4 2063.9 1760.7 3.0 57.2 60.1 117.2 
2017 993.3 1088.1 2081.5 1813.6 3.0 54.8 60.0 114.8 
2018 978.1 1120.8 2098.9 1868.0 3.0 52.4 60.0 112.4 
2019 960.9 1154.4 2115.3 1924.0 3.0 49.9 60.0 109.9 
2020 941.6 1189.0 2130.6 1981.7 3.0 47.5 60.0 107.5 
2021 920.2 1224.7 2144.9 2041.2 3.0 45.1 60.0 105.1 
2022 896.8 1261.5 2158.3 2102.4 3.0 42.7 60.0 102.7 
2023 871.4 1299.3 2170.7 2165.5 3.0 40.2 60.0 100.2 
2024 843.9 1338.3 2182.2 2230.5 3.0 37.8 60.0 97.8 
2025 814.4 1378.4 2192.8 2297.4 3.0 35.4 60.0 95.4 
2026 782.8 1419.8 2202.6 2366.3 3.0 33.1 60.0 93.1 
2027 749.2 1462.4 2211.6 2437.3 3.0 30.7 60.0 90.7 
2028 713.6 1506.2 2219.8 2510.4 3.0 28.4 60.0 88.4 
2029 675.9 1551.4 2227.3 2585.7 3.0 26.1 60.0 86.1 
2030 636.2 1598.0 2234.1 2663.3 3.0 23.9 60.0 83.9 
2031 594.4 1645.9 2240.3 2743.2 3.0 21.7 60.0 81.7 
2032 550.6 1695.3 2245.9 2825.5 3.0 19.5 60.0 79.5 
2033 504.7 1746.1 2250.9 2910.2 3.0 17.3 60.0 77.3 
2034 456.8 1798.5 2255.3 2997.6 3.0 15.2 60.0 75.2 
2035 406.8 1852.5 2259.3 3087.5 3.0 13.2 60.0 73.2 
2036 354.9 1908.1 2262.9 3180.1 3.0 11.2 60.0 71.2 
2037 300.8 1965.3 2266.1 3275.5 3.0 9.2 60.0 69.2 
2038 244.7 2024.3 2269.0 3373.8 3.0 7.3 60.0 67.3 
2039 186.6 2085.0 2271.6 3475.0 3.0 5.4 60.0 65.4 
2040 126.5 2147.5 2274.0 3579.2 3.0 3.5 60.0 63.5 
2041 64.3 2212.0 2276.2 3686.6 3.0 1.7 60.0 61.7 
2042 0.0 2278.3 2278.3 3797.2 3.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 
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C. 25-years Visco’sproposal: The computational details 
Table C.1: The amortization schedule – β = 3.0459 
t Roll-in D[t]= i = n = P[0] = iL= n = 
2013 422.0 422.0 0.0342 25 5.0 0.0300 25 
2014 234.8 651.8           
2015 211.0 854.7           
2016 171.0 1014.6           
Total 1038.8             
t 
ERF 
Balance 
(*) P[t] I[t] R[t] 
SL[t] 
(*) IL[t] A[t] 
  
 
(a) (b) (c)=(a+b) (d) (e)=(d)*iL (f)=(c)-(e) 
                
2013 417.0 5.0 14.4 19.4 5.0 0.0 19.4 
2014 643.7 8.0 22.3 30.3 13.0 0.2 30.2 
2015 843.6 11.1 29.2 40.3 24.1 0.4 39.9 
2016 1000.5 14.1 34.7 48.8 38.3 0.7 48.1 
2017 983.3 17.2 34.2 51.4 55.5 1.1 50.3 
2018 963.1 20.2 33.6 53.9 75.7 1.7 52.2 
2019 939.8 23.3 32.9 56.2 99.0 2.3 53.9 
2020 913.5 26.3 32.1 58.5 125.3 3.0 55.5 
2021 884.1 29.4 31.2 60.6 154.7 3.8 56.8 
2022 851.7 32.4 30.2 62.6 187.1 4.6 58.0 
2023 816.2 35.5 29.1 64.6 222.5 5.6 59.0 
2024 777.7 38.5 27.9 66.4 261.0 6.7 59.7 
2025 736.2 41.6 26.6 68.1 302.6 7.8 60.3 
2026 691.6 44.6 25.2 69.8 347.2 9.1 60.7 
2027 643.9 47.6 23.7 71.3 394.8 10.4 60.9 
2028 593.3 50.7 22.0 72.7 445.5 11.8 60.9 
2029 539.5 53.7 20.3 74.0 499.2 13.4 60.7 
2030 482.7 56.8 18.5 75.2 556.0 15.0 60.3 
2031 422.9 59.8 16.5 76.3 615.8 16.7 59.7 
2032 360.0 62.9 14.5 77.3 678.7 18.5 58.9 
2033 294.1 65.9 12.3 78.2 744.6 20.4 57.9 
2034 225.2 69.0 10.1 79.0 813.6 22.3 56.7 
2035 153.2 72.0 7.7 79.7 885.6 24.4 55.3 
2036 78.1 75.1 5.2 80.3 960.7 26.6 53.7 
2037 0.0 78.1 2.7 80.8 1038.8 28.8 52.0 
                
                
                
                
                
Total - 1038.8 557.2 1596.0 - 255.2 1340.8 
(*) End of the year   
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Table C.2: Fiscal policy implications 
t    Billion Euros % of GDP     
Y[t] 
Nominal GDP 1564.4 -     
        - Av. Growth Rate  3.0 -     
D[t] Outstanding Debt 1977.4 126.4     
S[t] Primary Surplus 45.4 2.9     
I[t] Interest expense 86.0 5.5     
BD[t] Budget Deficit 40.7 2.6     
 
I[t] Budget Deficit Primary Surplus 
t ERF 
% of 
GDP 
National 
Debt % of GDP Total 
% of 
GDP BD[t] 
Deficit-GDP    
 ratio S[t]  
Prim.-
Surplus-
GDP 
ratio 
  (a)   (b)   (c)=(a)+(b)   (d)   (e)=(c)-(d) 
                       
2013 19.4 1.2 62.3 3.9 81.7 5.1 41.9 2.6 39.8 2.5 
2014 30.2 1.8 54.2 3.3 84.4 5.1 26.6 1.6 57.8 3.5 
2015 39.9 2.3 46.9 2.7 86.9 5.1 25.6 1.5 61.2 3.6 
2016 48.1 2.7 41.2 2.3 89.4 5.1 24.7 1.4 64.7 3.7 
2017 50.3 2.8 42.4 2.3 92.7 5.1 30.8 1.7 61.9 3.4 
2018 52.2 2.8 43.7 2.3 95.9 5.1 32.6 1.7 63.3 3.4 
2019 53.9 2.8 45.0 2.3 99.0 5.1 33.6 1.7 65.3 3.4 
2020 55.5 2.8 46.4 2.3 101.9 5.1 34.6 1.7 67.2 3.4 
2021 56.8 2.8 47.8 2.3 104.6 5.1 35.7 1.7 68.9 3.4 
2022 58.0 2.8 49.2 2.3 107.2 5.1 36.7 1.7 70.5 3.4 
2023 59.0 2.7 50.7 2.3 109.6 5.1 37.8 1.7 71.8 3.3 
2024 59.7 2.7 52.2 2.3 111.9 5.0 39.0 1.7 73.0 3.3 
2025 60.3 2.6 53.8 2.3 114.1 5.0 40.1 1.7 73.9 3.2 
2026 60.7 2.6 55.4 2.3 116.1 4.9 41.4 1.7 74.7 3.2 
2027 60.9 2.5 57.0 2.3 117.9 4.8 42.6 1.7 75.3 3.1 
2028 60.9 2.4 58.7 2.3 119.6 4.8 43.9 1.7 75.7 3.0 
2029 60.7 2.3 60.5 2.3 121.2 4.7 45.2 1.7 76.0 2.9 
2030 60.3 2.3 62.3 2.3 122.6 4.6 46.5 1.7 76.0 2.9 
2031 59.7 2.2 64.2 2.3 123.8 4.5 47.9 1.7 75.9 2.8 
2032 58.9 2.1 66.1 2.3 125.0 4.4 49.4 1.7 75.6 2.7 
2033 57.9 2.0 68.1 2.3 126.0 4.3 50.9 1.7 75.1 2.6 
2034 56.7 1.9 70.1 2.3 126.8 4.2 52.4 1.7 74.4 2.5 
2035 55.3 1.8 72.2 2.3 127.5 4.1 54.0 1.7 73.6 2.4 
2036 53.7 1.7 74.4 2.3 128.1 4.0 55.6 1.7 72.6 2.3 
2037 52.0 1.6 76.6 2.3 128.6 3.9 57.2 1.7 71.4 2.2 
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Table C.3: Public debt dynamics 
  Debt (Billion euros) GDP Debt (as a % of GDP) 
t Extra National Total Level growth Extra National Total 
  (a) (b) (c)=(a)+(b) (d)    (e)=(a)/(d)  (f)=(b)/(d) (g)=(e)+(f) 
                  
2013 417.0 1597.3 2014.3 1611.3 3.0 25.9 99.1 125.0 
2014 643.7 1389.1 2032.8 1659.7 3.0 38.8 83.7 122.5 
2015 843.6 1203.7 2047.4 1709.5 3.0 49.4 70.4 119.8 
2016 1000.5 1057.4 2057.9 1760.7 3.0 56.8 60.1 116.9 
2017 983.3 1088.1 2071.4 1813.6 3.0 54.2 60.0 114.2 
2018 963.1 1120.8 2083.9 1868.0 3.0 51.6 60.0 111.6 
2019 939.8 1154.4 2094.2 1924.0 3.0 48.8 60.0 108.8 
2020 913.5 1189.0 2102.5 1981.7 3.0 46.1 60.0 106.1 
2021 884.1 1224.7 2108.8 2041.2 3.0 43.3 60.0 103.3 
2022 851.7 1261.5 2113.2 2102.4 3.0 40.5 60.0 100.5 
2023 816.2 1299.3 2115.5 2165.5 3.0 37.7 60.0 97.7 
2024 777.7 1338.3 2116.0 2230.5 3.0 34.9 60.0 94.9 
2025 736.2 1378.4 2114.6 2297.4 3.0 32.0 60.0 92.0 
2026 691.6 1419.8 2111.4 2366.3 3.0 29.2 60.0 89.2 
2027 643.9 1462.4 2106.3 2437.3 3.0 26.4 60.0 86.4 
2028 593.3 1506.2 2099.5 2510.4 3.0 23.6 60.0 83.6 
2029 539.5 1551.4 2091.0 2585.7 3.0 20.9 60.0 80.9 
2030 482.7 1598.0 2080.7 2663.3 3.0 18.1 60.0 78.1 
2031 422.9 1645.9 2068.8 2743.2 3.0 15.4 60.0 75.4 
2032 360.0 1695.3 2055.3 2825.5 3.0 12.7 60.0 72.7 
2033 294.1 1746.1 2040.3 2910.2 3.0 10.1 60.0 70.1 
2034 225.2 1798.5 2023.7 2997.6 3.0 7.5 60.0 67.5 
2035 153.2 1852.5 2005.6 3087.5 3.0 5.0 60.0 65.0 
2036 78.1 1908.1 1986.2 3180.1 3.0 2.5 60.0 62.5 
2037 0.0 1965.3 1965.3 3275.5 3.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
 
